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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
v. 
GENE GARZA, : Case No. 20060403-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 77-
18a-l and 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court fail to make an appropriate inquiry into Gene Garza's 
timely Motion to Dismiss Counsel? 
"[A] trial court's failure to investigate a . . . timely substitution request [made by 
an indigent party with appointed counsel] is per se error." State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 
962 (Utah Ct.App.1998). While the inquiry itself may be subject to an abuse of 
discretion standard, see State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 272 (Utah App.1987), "the 
court's failure to sufficiently explore Appellant's complaints in this case leaves us without 
the information needed to evaluate whether [he] was entitled to substitute counsel either 
as a matter of sound discretion or as a matter of law." L.K. v. State; 48 P.3d 244,2002 
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UT App 149. "Because error in assessing whether a defendant may represent himself is 
structural, it can never be harmless." United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120, 127-37 
(3rd Cir. 2002) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168,177 (1984)). 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing Gene Garza to 
consecutive sentences without appropriate consideration of relevant mitigation evidence? 
"We review the sentencing decisions of a trial court for abuse of discretion." State 
v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1995). "Abuse of discretion fmay be manifest if 
the actions of the judge in sentencing were "inherently unfair" or if the judge imposed a 
"clearly excessive sentence." Id. (quoting State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1120 (Utah 
App. 1995) (citations omitted in original)). Moreover, "[a]n abuse of discretion results 
when the judge Tails to consider all legally relevant factors/ " State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 
1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (quoting State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989)). 
"A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial court has abused its 
discretion, failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that 
exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah 
Ct.App.1993). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
On the first issue, Gene Garza personally filed a "Motion for Counsel to 
Withdraw" expressly indicating his desire to dismiss and relieve his counsel based on a 
conflict of interest, lack of communication and ineffective assistance of counsel. R. 130-
32. Addendum A. On December 12, 2005, the court heard argument from counsel for 
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Gene Garza that his client desired to discharge his lawyers indicating that the attorney 
client relationship had deteriorated to the point that the client had refused to cooperate 
with counsel. R. 387. Addendum B. Although Gene Garza was eligible for and had 
appointed counsel to represent him, the trial court, without inquiry into the relationship 
between client and counsel, failed to address the issue and instructed Gene Garza to 
inform the court if new counsel was hired. R. 387, pp. 2-4. 
On the second issue, Gene Garza's counsel filed a sentencing memorandum with 
the court identifying mitigation evidence omitted from the presentence report and 
expressly requesting the court to pronounce concurrent sentences based on those 
mitigation factors. R. 339-42. Addendum C. At the sentencing hearing counsel 
referenced that filed memorandum and again requested that a concurrent sentence be 
imposed on all convictions based on mitigation evidenced, including his client's age and 
youth as an appropriate mitigating sentencing factor. R 384, p. 5. Addendum D. 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The texts of the following relevant constitutional and statutory provisions are 
contained in this brief or Addendum E. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 31, 2005, an Information was filed charging Gene Garza with one count 
of Criminal Homicide, a 1st degree felony; two counts of Criminal Mischief, 2nd degree 
felonies; one count of Criminal Mischief, a 3rd degree felony; and one count of Criminal 
Mischief; a class A misdemeanor. R. 1-3. 
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On November 18, 2005, Gene Garza filed a Motion for Counsel to Withdraw 
stating a conflict of interest, incomplete requests, ineffective assistance of counsel, and 
lack ofcommunication as grounds to discharge his attorneys. R. 130-132. Addendum A. 
Gene Garza's motion was summarily addressed at a hearing held on December 12, 
2005. R. 387, pp. 2-4. Addendum B. Although counsel for Gene Garza provided 
information documenting the deterioration of the attorney client privilege, Judge 
Atherton did not inquire into Gene Garza's complaints whatsoever. Instead the court 
chose to advise Gene Garza that these attorneys would stay on board until he hired new 
counsel and that the trial would proceed as scheduled, some six weeks out. Id. 
The court's Minute Entry from that hearing states "Defendant Transported - Court 
Orders Counsel to stay on board until Defendant hires private counsel. Jury Trial is to go 
forward as scheduled..." R. 136. 
Because Gene Garza's was unable financially to hire private counsel, he was 
represented by John West and Joel Kittrell, from the Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Association, the two attorneys he specifically motioned the court to remove from his 
case, at his Jury Trial beginning January 31, 2006. R. 381. 
On February 1, 2006, the State filed an Amended Information charging Gene 
Garza with Count I, Criminal Homicide, Murder, a 1st degree felony; Count II, Criminal 
Mischief, a 2nd degree felony; Count III, IV, V, Criminal Mischief; all 3rd degree felonies. 
R. 281-283. Following the trial, the jury returned a verdict of "Guilty" on all counts. R. 
332-36. 
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On April 14, 2006, the trial court sentenced Gene Garza "to an indeterminate term 
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison" on Count I, 
Criminal Homicide, Murder, a 1st degree felony. R. 349. The trial court sentenced Gene 
Garza "to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in 
the Utah State Prison" on Count II, Criminal Mischief, a 2nd degree felony. The trial 
court also sentenced Gene Garza "to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison" on Count III, IV, and V, Criminal Mischief, all 3rd degree felonies. 
R 349. All sentences were ordered by the court to run consecutive to each other. R. 349. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Roughly two weeks into May, 2005, at approximately three o'clock, Gene Garza 
was enjoying the afternoon by riding a bicycle on the patio of his apartment with his baby 
brother, Angel. R. 383:386, 418. While Gene Garza, his sister Desirae Landeros, and 
Angel were outside when a vehicle containing Mr. Padilla and two other males pulled up 
in front of Gene Garza's residence. R. 383:387, 418. Mr. Padilla exited the vehicle and 
immediately started yelling at Gene Garza. R. 383:389, 419. 
During the incident Mr. Padilla threatened Gene Garza by telling him multiple 
times "you're going to get it," amongst other similar threatening messages. R. 383:389, 
393, 419, 422. Additionally, Mr. Padilla pulled up his shirt to expose something black 
that multiple witnesses testified appeared to be a handgun. R. 383:389-390, 394, 421. 
Due to the serious nature of Mr. Padilla's threats and Gene Garza's belief that Mr. Padilla 
had brandished a firearm, Gene Garza told Ms. Landeros to take Angel inside. R. 
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383:390,422. Throughout the encounter, Gene Garza tried to reason with Mr. Padilla by 
telling him multiple times to not be stupid and asking him to leave. R. 383:389, 390, 
419-420. Eventually Mr. Padilla threatened Gene Garza again, telling him'" Watch, I'm 
going to get you,' and he left." R. 383:422. 
Approximately two weeks later on the afternoon of May 25, 2005, Gene Garza 
was spending time with his friend David Hernandez, Mr. Hernandez's girlfriend Tiffany 
Sierra and their baby. R. 382:230, 383:346. 
Around five o'clock p.m., Mr. Hernandez drove Gene Garza to his home. R. 
383:424. Gene Garza went inside to get a DVD to loan to Mr. Hernandez. R. 382:245, 
383:347, 424. After retrieving a DVD, Gene Garza went back outside. R. 383:398, 436. 
As Mr. Hernandez and Gene Garza were talking, Mr. Padilla pulled up. R. 382:232; 
383:424, 436. Mr. Padilla got out of his silver car and initiated an argument with Gene 
Garza. R. 382:232, 245; 383:425, 436. Gene Garza told Mr. Padilla to leave and 
repeated to Mr. Padilla that he did not want to fight him; he said so multiple times 
throughout the confrontation. R. 382:233, 234; 383:425. Mr. Padilla continued to argue 
with Gene Garza and wanted to fight him. R. 382:233. During the course of the 
confrontation, Mr. Padilla was heard telling Gene Garza that he also had guns. R. 
382:352. In addition to his multiple attempts to diffuse the situation, Gene Garza was 
backing up and retreating towards his home during the confrontation. 382:246, 248, 
383:349 
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After hearing that her son, Gene Garza, was involved in an argument outside, Ms. 
Peralta went outside to see what was happening. R. 383:399,436. Ms. Peralta was 
informed by Gene Garza that he was trying to get Mr. Padilla to leave. R. 383:399, 427, 
428. Ms. Peralta similarly told Mr. Padilla to leave multiple times. R. 383:381, 399,401, 
402, 403,428. Mr. Padilla told Ms. Peralta that Gene Garza "better watch his back 
because he was going to put a bullet in it." R. 383:401, 409,410,428. After assessing the 
situation, Ms. Peralta told Gene Garza to leave. R. 382:249, 383:365, 403, 428. Gene 
Garza then got into Mr. Hernandez's vehicle and they left the apartment complex. R. 
382: 236, 250; 383:354, 404, 428. 
After Gene Garza left, Mr. Padilla ran to his car. R. 382:250. Mr. Padilla got into 
his vehicle, did a U-turn, and also proceeded to drive towards the exit of the complex. R. 
382:250; 383:404-405. As Mr. Hernandez drove away from the complex, Ms. Sierra and 
Gene Garza saw that Mr. Padilla had entered his car and appeared to be following them. 
R. 382, 237; 383:355, 429. 
Mr. Hernandez then took his first left and pulled into a stranger's driveway that 
had a fence that could conceal their vehicle in order to hide from Mr. Padilla. R. 
382:237-238, 250,253; 383:355, 357,429,437. After waiting until they thought Mr. 
Padilla had passed, Mr. Hernandez returned to the main road. R. 382:238; 383:355. 
They then realized that Mr. Padilla was in front of them turning left. R. 382:238, 251; 
383:356, 431. Mr. Hernandez then turned right so that they were traveling in the opposite 
direction of Mr. Padilla. R. 382:238,251. 
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After traveling down the road, Mr. Hernandez and his passengers noticed that Mr. 
Padilla had turned around and was approaching their vehicle. R.382:238; 383:362, 432, 
437. After numerous threats to get or shoot Gene Garza, he believed that Mr. Padilla 
may be preparing to shoot him. R. 383:433. Mr. Padilla pulled along side the 
passenger's side of Mr. Hernandez's vehicle where Gene Garza was seated in the front 
seat. R. 382:236, 239; 383:371. Mr. Padilla lifted his right hand. 383:364, 371, 434, 
439. Gene Garza thought Mr. Padilla was about to shoot him. R. 383:434, 443. In order 
to defend himself and his passengers including a baby, Gene Garza shot Mr. Padilla four 
times. 383:434,439. 
Mr. Padilla was immediately unconscious. His car drifted into Mr. Hernandez's 
vehicle, and eventually collided with three other cars before finally stopping. R. 382:240 
Mr. Padilla died at the hospital later that evening. No weapons were found on him or in 
his vehicle. 
After the shots were fired, Mr. Hernandez left the scene. R.382:241. Gene Garza 
turned himself in to the police the next morning. R. 383:435, 440. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Gene Garza filed a Motion for Counsel to Withdraw on November 18, 2005. A 
hearing was held December 12, 2005, to address the motion; however, at that hearing 
Judge Atherton failed to inquire of Gene Garza into the basis and substance of the 
motion. Gene Garza's counsel identified to the court that his client desired to discharge 
he and co-counsel and had yet been able to retain private counsel. Counsel indicated that 
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Gene Garza was not cooperating with them to prepare for trial. The court did not inquire 
of Gene Garza about his motion to discharge counsel. Well established law requires the 
court to make an inquiry into the attorney client relationship. 
Gene Garza was sentenced by the court to a five to life, a one to fifteen and three 
zero to five year sentences, all running consecutive to each other. The trial court abused 
its discretion in sentencing Gene Garza in this consecutive fashion without adequate 
findings and without discussion of the statutorily required mitigation considerations. The 
court also abused its discretion in erroneously citing the long established mitigation 
consideration of youth as an aggravating factor to support a consecutive sentence. The 
trial court is charged with identifying, on the record, the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances that affect its sentencing decision, because ff [sentencing should be 
conducted with full information and with careful deliberation of all relevant factors." 
State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1300 (Utah 1993). A trial court's failure to discharge this 
duty will result in the case being remanded for resentencing with instructions that the trial 
court consider all of the circumstances relevant to the sentencing decision. Id. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ADHERE TO ITS DUTY 
TO INQUIRE INTO GENE GARZA'S REQUEST TO DISCHARGE 
COUNSEL. 
On November 18, 2005, Gene Garza filed a Motion for Counsel to Withdraw. 
Gene Garza expressly requested that the court excuse, dismiss and relieve appointed 
counsel as his lawyers citing multiple grounds for the motion including conflict of 
interest, incomplete requests, ineffective assistance of counsel, and lack of 
communication. R. 130-132. Addendum A. At a hearing on December 12, 2005, 
counsel explained to the court that they were present to review Gene Garza's motion to 
discharge him and his co-counsel. R. 387, p. 2. Addendum B. 
Judge Atherton reviewed the Motion but took no immediate action; she wrote "no 
action," on the motion, then initialed, and dated her comment 11/22/04. (It appears that 
the judge's notation was erroneously dated the previous year.) R. 130. 
At the hearing held on Gene Garza's motion on December 12, 2005, without 
investigating or even inquiring into the grounds to discharge counsel stated in Gene 
Garza's motion, Judge Atherton simply asked Gene Garza, "Are you intending to hire 
Counsel, then?" R. 387:2. Gene Garza replied "My family's looking into it." R. 387:2. 
Although Gene Garza qualified for (R. 25-26) and was represented by a public defender 
(R. 28-29), Judge Atherton left Gene Garza without any options as an indigent defendant 
when she replied "Your attorney's on board until you do that [hire private counsel]." R. 
387:2. 
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Once a defendant requests a substitution of counsel, the trial court has a 
duty to inquire into the legitimacy of the complaint. A summary denial of the 
defendant's request is improper. See State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah 
App. 1998) ("By summarily denying defendant's motion in this case, the trial 
court put the defendant in the position of choosing between proceeding to trial 
with counsel whom he believed was unprepared and incompatible or proceeding 
pro se."); United States v. Jennings, 945 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1991). Further, in this 
case Gene Garza was not even given the opportunity to proceed pro se. Judge 
Atherton specifically stated, "I'm not going to permit to go forward without 
Counsel." R. 387:2. 
The court completely failed to fulfill its duty of inquiry into Gene Garza's 
motion and such inaction amounted to a summary denial. 
[A] trial court's refusal to substitute counsel can only be properly reviewed 
if the trial court conducts a meaningful inquiry. Only the trial court can 
conduct a full evidentiary hearing to explore the substantiality of 
defendant's allegations without reference to subsequent developments and 
later-acquired knowledge. ... The pretrial scrutiny not only reduces the 
likelihood of a post conviction ineffective assistance claim, but also creates 
a record that reviewing courts can rely upon when an ineffectiveness issue 
is raised on appeal. 
State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah App. 1998) (citation omitted). 
At the hearing held on December 12, 2005, (Addendum B) appointed 
counsel informed the Court of the serious breakdown in communication that had 
destroyed the attorney-client relationship. Counsel for Gene Garza reported to the 
Court that Gene Garza has "refused to cooperate with us in preparation for the 
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trial." R. 387:2. Counsel further informed Judge Atherton that "It's been a little 
difficult to prepare. As I indicated, Gene Garza is not willing to communicate 
with Counsel. We've been up to the jail to talk with him about evidence, and he's 
refused to talk to us." R. 387:3. The court dismissed Mr. West's statements and 
simply stated "Mr. Garza, it can only benefit you to talk with your lawyer. That's 
all I can tell you. You're charged with the most serious offense anyone can be 
charged with. I'm intending to go to trial in January." R. 387:3. The Court did 
not inquire into basis of the breakdown in communication and instead emphasized 
the desire to keep on schedule although it was to Gene Garza's detriment. See 
United States v. Adelzo-Gonzalez, 268 F.3d 772, 778 (9th Cir. 2001) ("There was 
too much emphasis on the appointed counsel's ability to provide adequate 
representation and not enough attention to the status and quality of the attorney-
client relationship"); see also id. (citation omitted) ("Even if a defendant's counsel 
is competent, a serious breakdown in communication can result in an inadequate 
defense"). 
In State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1998), defendant Vessey 
"stated he felt counsel could not represent him because they had a 'conflict of 
interest' and because counsel 'refuses evidence I have brought forth ... for defence 
[sic] of my case.' The trial court summarily denied defendant's motion for 
substitution of counsel, the case proceeded to trial, and defendant was convicted." 
Id at 961. 
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On appeal, this Court found that "a trial court's refusal to substitute counsel 
can only be properly reviewed if the trial court conducts a meaningful inquiry." 
Id. at 964. The Vessey court fashioned a remedy there which is unrealistic to Gene 
Garza's situation. 
We therefore remand this case to the trial court to hold an evidentiary 
hearing to determine if defendant's complaints about his appointed counsel 
justified the appointment of substitute counsel. If so, the trial court should 
grant defendant a new trial. However, if the court determines defendant's 
request for substitution of counsel was unfounded, the judgment of 
conviction would stand as entered. 
Id. Due to the temptation for the trial court to rationalize improperly as to whether 
good cause existed for the substitution of counsel, Gene Garza instead requests a 
new trial. See State v. Bakalov, 862 P.2d 1354, 1355 (Utah 1993) (per curiam) 
(citing State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) That court noted that "[t]o ask 
the trial court to address the admissibility question now would be to tempt it to 
reach a post hoc rationalization for the admission of this pivotal evidence. Such a 
mode of proceeding holds too much potential for abuse. The only fair way to 
proceed is to vacate defendant's conviction and remand the matter for retrial." 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 789. 
Gene Garza respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and 
remand his case for a new trial. 
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POINT II THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY 
IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES AND IN FAILING TO 
CONSIDER STATUTORY MITIGATION FACTORS. 
Gene Garza insists that the trial court abused its discretion when imposing 
consecutive sentences on all counts of the amended information while failing to 
consider all of the necessary factors before imposing consecutive sentences. Our 
sentencing code dictates, in pertinent part, the following: 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more 
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive 
sentences for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall 
indicate in the order of judgment and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to 
each other; ... 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or 
consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1), (2) (2002)(see Addendum E for a complete copy 
of the statute). Both the Supreme Court and this Court have reviewed this statute 
and concluded that concurrent sentences are favored over consecutive ones. State 
v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah \99S)(quoting State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 
1301 (Utah 1993)); State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, \ 43, 52 P.3d 451. 
The requirement for the trial court when sentencing someone for multiple 
convictions is to determine the appropriateness of whether to impose a concurrent 
or consecutive sentence based on the gravity and circumstances of the offense, the 
number of victims, and the history, character and rehabilitative needs of the 
defendant. The overriding consideration is that the sentence of the court must be 
14 
just. State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990). The court breached its 
obligation in this matter when failing to weigh a number of mitigation factors 
presented by the defense and specifically in misapplying other mitigation factors 
as aggravation factors to justify her decision to sentence Gene Garza consecutively 
on all five counts of the amended information, to wit: a five years to life term on 
count one and to order him to serve a 1-15 term consecutively to that life term and 
three more 0-5 terms consecutive to the one to fifteen and to each other for a total 
of 5 years to life plus a 1 to 30 year consecutive sentence to that 5 to life sentence 
(or a sentence of a minimum of six years to life plus another thirty years). R. 384, 
p.10. 
In ordering this sentence the court reviewed the presentence report of the 
department of Adult Probation and Parole, a sentencing memorandum prepared by 
Gene Garza's appointed attorney (Addendum C) and then listened to an extremely 
short discussion with counsel where issues of aggravation and mitigation were 
only summarily discussed. (Addendum D for Sentencing transcript.) Counsel for 
Gene Garza nominally raised six claims of mitigation that were overlooked and 
omitted from the presentence report. None of them were discussed in detail 
although each added to the five other mitigation factors raised in his sentencing 
memorandum. R. 384. 
This Court has previously indicated that specific written findings are not 
required of the trial court on non-minimum mandatory sentencings and that the 
court on appeal may be able to determine from the absence of findings on a certain 
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factor, by implication, that the trial court was not persuaded by an argument(s) 
presented on the defendant's behalf. State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, \ 27, 
132 P.3d 793. However, this Court also decided that "a critical element in the 
[sentencing] process is the fact finding role in determining the existence of 
circumstances in aggravation and mitigation." State v. Moreno, 2005 UT App. 
200, f 12, 113 P.3d 992. This Court used this Moreno principle in deciding 
Malaga to determine that "any mitigating or aggravating circumstance found by 
the trial court must be supported by evidence." Malaga, 132 P.3d at % 27, quoting 
Moreno, 113 P.3d at^ f 13. 
Gene Garza urges that the trial court erred in concluding that an argument 
of counsel, that Gene Garza's youth should operate to mitigate his punishment and 
justify concurrent sentences on all five counts, was misapplied by the court and 
heavily relied on as an aggravating factor to warrant the consecutive sentencings. 
In State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court remanded 
the case of a sixteen year old for resentencing where the court had not taken into 
count (although was aware of) the defendant's youth when sentencing him to 
consecutive terms of life plus minimum mandatory terms of fifteen and nine years 
to life all running consecutively. 
The Court stated: 
We agree with Strunk that his youthful age was a mitigating factor, 
and the record reveals that the trial court was clearly aware of his age. It 
was discussed at the time the guilty plea was entered. In addition, Strunk's 
attorney specifically argued at sentencing that Strunk's age should be 
considered as a mitigating circumstance. Finally, the prosecutor twice 
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alluded to the fact that the State was not seeking the death penalty due to 
Strunk's age. However, being aware of his age and taking it into account are 
not the same thing. The court listed its mitigating circumstances, and 
Strunk's youthful age was not among them. Additionally, the court 
expressly stated that there were "no other mitigating circumstances" than 
the two listed. Sentencing should be conducted with full information and 
with careful deliberation of all relevant factors. Because it appears from the 
record before us that the trial court did not consider Strunk's age as a 
mitigating factor, we must remand the case for resentencing on child 
kidnapping and aggravated sexual abuse of a child. 
Strunk, 846 P.2d at 1300. The Court later added: 
Although under the statute a court may impose consecutive sentences for 
separate offenses committed in the course of a single criminal episode, we 
find that in this case the trial court abused its discretion in failing to 
sufficiently consider defendant's rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme 
youth and the absence of prior violent crimes. 
Id. at 1301-02. 
This Court, itself, has recognized youth to be mitigation evidence. In 
Moreno this Court acknowledged: 
Moreover, unlike age, which is not generally subject to dispute, and 
which should be considered as mitigating when a defendant is very young 
and unsophisticated, each of the mitigating circumstances that Moreno 
claims the trial court ignored is subject to some dispute in most, if not all, 
cases. 
Moreno, 113 P.3d at ^14. Nonetheless, the trial court responded to counsel's 
request to consider his youth as mitigation evidence in support of concurrent 
sentences as follows: 
The fact that you're young, I think is not a mitigating factor. If anything, I 
see it as an aggravating factor. I think your youth is a danger. Your 
judgment is poor as a result, perhaps, of your youth. I mean, this is a crime 
of such violence and such danger to other people it is really beyond 
comprehension to me. 
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R. 384, p. 9. The court found no mitigation factors in this case at all, in part 
because few were argued and none were dwelt on by his counsel. Gene Garza's 
youth (age twenty-one) and the lack of a serious criminal history (a juvenile 
assault when he was thirteen years old and a class B misdemeanor as an adult), his 
character and rehabilitative needs justified some weight and discussion. For 
example, the presentence report recognized, although falling short of labeling it as 
mitigation, and acknowledged that Gene Garza turned himself into the police the 
day after the event. PSR, p.5. 
Our appellate courts have discussed age as mitigation in the context of 
some very serious cases choosing to focus on youth (or age) only in conjunction 
with the presence or lack of sophistication accompanied by a criminal history and 
rehabilitative needs. Malaga, 132 P.2d at 127 {citing Moreno, 113 P.3d at f 14); 
see also Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1302 
(Utah 1993). Younger actors than Gene Garza have had consecutive sentence 
convictions both remanded and upheld. Cf, Strunk (a juvenile defendant with a 
lack of a criminal history) with Russell (a juvenile defendant with an extensive 
juvenile record who had failed to respond to prior attempts to rehabilitate him); 
Malaga (a defendant only 20 years old but where consecutive sentences were 
sustained because of extensive juvenile record and adult conviction). The 
distinction in the cases are not the severity of the crimes as all of these cases, 
including the one at bar, contain disturbing and egregious facts, but rather the prior 
instances of criminal behavior and sophistication or lack of those appear to control 
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the appellate courts' decisions on whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
ordering consecutive sentences. 
Likewise, older defendants than Gene Garza have had their consecutive 
sentences for serious offenses either sustained or overturned on appeal precisely 
because of their sophistication and criminal history or the lack of sophistication 
and criminal history. See State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356 (Utah App., 1996) ( a 23 
year old with gang culture and aggressive criminal behavior including aggravated 
assault, robbery, weapons and battery); State v. Moreno, 2005 UT App. 200 (age 
not available but noted as an adult male not eligible for the treatment received by 
Strunk due to criminal history); Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah, 1998) (age unknown 
but his criminal history devoid of any prior serious criminal wrongdoing received 
a reversal of his consecutive sentences); and State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211 (age 
unknown but consecutive sentences remanded with reversal and instructions to 
consider the lack of sophistication and criminal history and other statutory 
requirements of mitigation). 
Gene Garza insists that because the trial court did not consider mitigation 
factors including the considerations of his history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs, and because the court misapplied the youth consideration in his sentencing. 
The court's failure to address and appropriately consider these important statutory 
factors resulted in improperly imposed consecutive sentences on Gene Garza. 
This Court, in Perez, so concluded in a sentencing sufficiently similar to that 
complained of here: 
19 
The only comment at the sentencing hearing that could be construed 
as touching on Perez's history, character, or rehabilitative needs is defense 
counsel's statement that Perez was not on probation at the time of the 
incident. The trial court's brief commentary dealt only with the "gravity and 
circumstances of the offenses," and did not explicitly address the 
presentence report's recommendation of concurrent sentences. In short, 
there is nothing in this record to indicate that the trial court "considered] 
the ... history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in 
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-401(4) (1999). If Perez is again tried for attempted murder and 
convicted by a properly instructed jury, the sentencing court must consider 
all of the statutorily prescribed factors for determining whether to impose 
consecutive sentences. 
Perez, 52 P.3d atf 48. 
Gene Garza respectfully requests that this Court vacate the consecutive 
sentences imposed in his case and remand with an order for the court to resentence 
him consistent with the statutory requirements including giving appropriate 
mitigation weight to his lack of criminal history and youthful age. 
CONCLUSION 
For all or any of the forgoing reasons, Defendant/Appellant, Gene Garza, 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse his conviction and remand his case for 
a new trial or in the alternative remand the matter for a new sentencing hearing 
with instructions that the trial court conduct an evaluation of all the appropriate 
considerations of mitigation. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
The Appellant requests oral argument in this matter pursuant to Rule 29(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This is a matter that raises several 
important constitutional issues and it is the position of the Appellant that the Court 
20 
could be significantly aided in its decision making process by oral argument from 
the parties. 
SUBMITTED this 3*% day of February, 2007. 
RONALD S.FUJINO 
Attorney for Gene Garza 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I have caused the original and seven copies of the 
foregoing to be hand-delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 
5th Floor, P. O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and^ur copies to 
the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 
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1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 (Electronically recorded on December 12, 2005) 
3 MR. WEST: Your Honor, would you call the Gene Garza 
4 matter? 
5 THE COURT: (Inaudible). 
6 MR. WEST: Well, he's filed a motion to discharge 
7 Counsel; but so far as I know, he hasn't retained a private 
8 Counsel. He's refused to .cooperate with us in preparation for 
9 the trial. Mr. Cantrell was here earlier, but he had to be in 
10 another Court. 
11 THE COURT: Okay, So I have two cases with Mr. Garza, 
12 and were set for trial, right? 
13 MR. WEST: We are. We're scheduled for trial the last 
14 day of January and the first three days of February. 
15 THE COURT: Okay, are you Gene Garza? 
16 MR. GARZA: Yes. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. Are you intending to hire Counsel, 
18 then? 
19 MR. GARZA: My family's looking into it. 
20 THE COURT: Okay, that's fine. Your attorney's on 
21 board until you do that. I'm not going to permit to go forward 
22 without Counsel. So just let me know. We're set for trial. 
23 MR. BURMESTER: Your Honor, just for the record, the 
24 State objects to this, would object to — I guess what we 
25 really object to is delay of the trial. If we have an interest 
-3-
1 in having a speedy trial as well, and do not wish delay of the 
2 trial date. I mean — 
3 THE COURT: No, we're set for trial. When are — we're 
4 set for the end of — 
5 MR. WEST: January, February. 
6 THE COURT: Yeah, we're going to trial in January; and 
7 so just be prepared, Mr. West. 
8 MR. WEST: It's been a little difficult to prepare. 
9 As I indicated, Mr. Garza is not willing to communicate with 
10 Counsel. We've been up to the jail to talk with him about 
11 evidence, and he's refused to talk with us. So this is — 
12 THE COURT: Mr. Garza, it can only benefit you to talk 
13 with your lawyer. That's all I can tell you. You're charged 
14 with the most serious offense anyone can be charged with. I'm 
15 intending to go to trial in January. 
16 Now, the victim's family is involved in this case, 
17 Mr. Burmester? 
18 MR. BURMESTER: They are. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand, Mr. Garza, 
2 0 that you have a right to a speedy trial; and the Legislature 
21 specifically has passed legislation indicating that the victim 
22 has as much a right to a speedy trial as you do. Those are 
23 things I have to weigh. 
24 I'm intending still to go to trial in about six weeks 
25 on this case; and just kind of be well served with either 
immediately getting Counsel o: 
that we're going to trial, or 
own attorney, okay? 
MR. WEST: Thank you, 
THE COURT: Thanks. 
(Hearing concluded) 
- 4 -
board with the understanding 




JOHN K. WEST, #4440 
JOEL KITTRELL, #9071 
ULTAN DOYLE, #9823 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Case No. 051903311 
Judge Judith S.H. Atherton 
Defendant, Gene Garza, by counsel submits the following memorandum for the use of the 
Court in sentencing and for the use of the Board of Pardons. 
This memorandum is intended to supplement the Presentence Investigation Report that 
has been filed in this case. As is often the case when a case goes to trial, the pre-sentence 
investigator is ignorant of the facts and evidence which came to light during trial. Consequently, 
the "Tactual Summary of Offense" is incomplete and often biased as it is based solely upon the 
version of events presented in the police reports. 
- ^ F I 
t»\. 
Illustrative of this phenomenon is the fact thai much of the factual summary in this case is 
pendant upon an erroneous statement in the police reports attributed to apartment manager 
Priscilla Serne, which would lead the reader to believe that defendant Gene Garza followed the 
decedent Jr. Padilla from the apartment complex after a confrontation there. 
Unfortunately, the pre-sentence investigator does not even include in his summary, the 
statements of the State's eye witnesses who in police reports, preliminary hearing testimony, and 
trial testimony establish that Padilla followed Garza from the complex. While the Court is well 
aware of this evidence, this omission must be corrected for the benefit of the Board of Pardons. 
TRIAL EVIDENCE 
Accordingly, the following points are presented as mitigation on behalf of defendant 
Gene Garza and are produced here for the education of the Board of Pardons and Parole which 
otherwise may have no knowledge of the uncontroverted evidence presented at trial: 
I. The Confrontation Began in Front of Gene Garza's Home. 
The uncontroverted evidence presented by both the State's witnesses and witnesses for 
the defense was that Padilla initiated the confrontation in front of Gene Garza's home. Padilla 
did not live at that complex. There was also evidence presented that Padilla had confronted 
Garza on past occasions. 
II. Padilla Threatened Garza on The Day of the Shooting. 
Uncontroverted testimony of the State's witnesses Tiffany Sierra, and David Hernandez 
established that Padilla approached Garza in front of Garza's home in a threatening mamier. The 
testimony of Anna Peralta, Garza's mother, was that Padilla confronted Gene and in Gene's 
presence told her that Gene had better watch out because he would get a bullet in his back. 
III. Padilla Refused to Leave. And Did Not Leave Until After Garza Had Left. 
The same witnesses testified that despite repeated requests from Garza, and Peralta for 
Padilla to leave Garza's home, Padilla refused to do so. Only after Garza had left the complex in 
the car with David Hernandez, Tiffany Sierra and their son, did Padilla also leave. Padilla, 
whose car had been facing toward the interior of the complex, did a U-turn and followed Garza. 
IV. Garza Tried to Avoid Further Confrontation With Padilla. 
Significantly, the uncontroverted testimony at trial was entirely consistent with written 
statements obtained by police early in the investigation. That testimony was that Garza, 
Hernandez, and Sierra attempted to lose Padilla. All three testified that they saw that Padilla was 
following them and so they turned up a side street and into a driveway behind a privacy fence 
and waited for Padilla to go by. All three testified that after Padilla had gone by, they saw him 
turn north on 3200 West. Accordingly, they turned south on 3200 West. All three were 
surprised when upon reaching 4100 South they found that Padilla had made a U-turn and was 
following them. 
V. Garza Feared For His Life at The Time of The Shooting. 
Garza and Hernandez testified that Padilla accelerated his car up next to their car and 
made a gesture toward them with his hand. Garza believed Padilla to be holding a weapon and 
so he shot a handgun toward Padilla. 
L11 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the jury was not convinced that Garza acted in self defense. However, the 
uncontroverted facts that Padilla was the initial aggressor and that Garza sought to avoid further 
confrontation should mitigate in favor of Mr. Garza. Accordingly, the defense urges this Court to 
impose the sentences to run concurrently with each other. Further, the defense urges the Board 
of Pardons to consider these factors as well as Mr. Garza's relatively limited prior criminal 
history in fixing a parole date. 
Dated this /( day of A pi l\ 20 Qb . 
WL l 
John K|. Wekt 
Attorney for\ Defendant iey 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum to The Salt 
Lake County District Attorney's Office, 111 East Broadway, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: LET'S TAKE THE MATTERS OF STATE OF UTAH 
VERSUS GENE GARZA. CASE NUMBERS 051903311, 051904893. 
WILL COUNSEL STATE THEIR APPEARANCES? 
MR. WEST: JOHN WEST APPEARING FOR MR. GARZA. 
MR. KENDALL: BILL KENDALL FOR THE STATE. 
THE COURT: IS THIS MR. GARZA THEN WITH YOU, 
MR. WEST? 
MR. WEST: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: LET'S TAKE THE FIRST CASE. THIS IS THE 
TIME SET FOR SENTENCING. MR. GARZA WAS FOUND GUILTY OF MURDER, 
A 1ST DEGREE FELONY; CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, A 2ND DEGREE FELONY; 
THREE OTHER COUNTS OF CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, 3RD DEGREE FELONIES, 
AT A JURY TRIAL. 
I HAVE REVIEWED THE PRESENTENCE REPORT AND ALSO YOUR 
MEMORANDUM, MR. WEST. HAVE YOU HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO GO OVER 
THE PRESENTENCE REPORT AND SPEAK WITH YOUR CLIENT? 
MR. WEST: YOUR HONOR, I'VE REVIEWED THE REPORT 
MYSELF. I'VE TOLD MR. GARZA WHAT'S IN THE REPORT AND I'VE MADE 
A COPY FOR HIM. HE HASN'T READ IT VERBATIM. I THINK HE'S 
AWARE OF EVERYTHING THAT'S IN THE REPORT THAT WE FEEL IMPORTANT 
FOR PURPOSES OF SENTENCING. 
THE COURT: AND YOU'RE PREPARED TO GO FORWARD? 
MR. WEST: I AM. 
THE COURT: MR. KENDALL, HAVE YOU HAD AN OPPORTUNITY 
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TO REVIEW THOSE DOCUMENTS AS WELL? 
MR. KENDALL: I HAVE, YOUR HONOR. I ALSO HAVE A 
LETTER THAT WAS WRITTEN FROM THE VICTIM'S MOTHER THAT WE 
FORWARDED TO THE COURT. I DON'T KNOW IF THAT MADE ITS WAY TO 
YOUR FILE OR NOT. 
THE COURT: WELL, I HAVE SOMETHING IN THE PRESENTENCE 
REPORT FROM THE VICTIM'S MOTHER. I DON'T KNOW IF IT'S THE 
SAME. 
MR. KENDALL: I THINK IT IS. IT'S SLIGHTLY 
DIFFERENT, YOUR HONOR. IF I MAY APPROACH? 
THE COURT: MR. WEST, HAVE YOU HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO 
LOOK AT THAT? 
MR. WEST: I HAVE. I THOUGHT IT WAS THE SAME THING. 
THE TRANSLATION MAY BE SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT. I THOUGHT IT WAS 
THE SAME INFORMATION. 
THE COURT: NO PROBLEM WITH MY LOOKING AT THIS, 
MR. WEST? 
MR. WEST: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. MR. WEST? 
MR. WEST: YOUR HONOR, I KNOW THE COURT'S READ MY 
SENTENCING MEMORANDUM. AND, OF COURSE, ONE CONCERN THAT I HAVE 
IS THE FACT THAT THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATOR OBVIOUSLY 
PREPARED HIS FACTUAL SUMMARY BASED ON THE POLICE REPORTS AND 
NOT ON ANY SUMMARY OF TRIAL. AND WE REALLY WOULDN'T EXPECT HE 
WOULD DO OTHERWISE. WE DON'T EXPECT HIM TO ORDER A TRANSCRIPT 
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OF THE TRIAL. AND I PREPARED THAT MEMORANDUM LARGELY FOR THE 
BENEFIT OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS BECAUSE I KNOW THE COURT HEARD 
THE TRIAL — 
THE COURT: I REMEMBER. 
MR. WEST: — AND HAS THAT EVIDENCE BEFORE IT. 
THE OTHER THING THAT I FIND A LITTLE BIT DISTURBING, 
THOUGH, IS IN THE — THERE'S A PAGE HAVING TO DO WITH THE 
AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. AND IT'S INTERESTING 
TO ME THAT THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATOR FINDS TWO AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCES. THEY SAY THAT THE OFFENDER PRESENTS A SERIOUS 
THREAT OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AND THAT HE USED A HANDGUN IN THE 
CRIME THAT CAUSED THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM. BUT THEY CITE 
ABSOLUTELY NO MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. AND I DON'T KNOW IF HE 
FORGOT OR WHAT. I'M NOT GOING TO ATTRIBUTE ANY MALICE TO HIM, 
BUT I BELIEVE THAT THE FOLLOWING LIST OF THINGS ON THEIR 
MITIGATION PAGE ARE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE. 
NO. 2, THAT THE OFFENDER ACTED UNDER STRONG 
PROVOCATION. 
NO. 3, THAT THERE WERE SUBSTANTIAL GROUNDS TO EXCUSE 
OR JUSTIFY CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR, THOUGH FAILING TO ESTABLISH A 
DEFENSE. 
NO. 4, THE OFFENDER IS YOUNG. 
NO. 6, RESTITUTION WOULD BE SEVERELY COMPROMISED BY 
INCARCERATION. 
NO. 7, THE OFFENDER'S ATTITUDE SUGGESTS AMENABILITY 
5 
TO SUPERVISION. 
AND NO. 12, ALL OFFENSES WERE FROM A SINGLE CRIMINAL 
EPISODE. 
I DON'T THINK — WELL, I SUPPOSE THE STATE COULD 
DISPUTE SOME OF THOSE, BUT I THINK SOME OF THOSE ARE JUST 
WITHOUT DISPUTE AND JUST PLAINLY NOT LISTED, WHICH SUGGESTS TO 
ME THAT THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATOR EITHER WASN'T PAYING 
ATTENTION OR PURPOSELY IGNORED THOSE THINGS. 
I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU'RE GOING TO SENTENCE MR. GARZA 
TO PRISON IN THIS CASE. 
THE COURT: YES. 
MR. WEST: AND I UNDERSTAND THAT IN A CASE INVOLVING 
A DEATH THAT THAT IS ALMOST ALWAYS AN APPROPRIATE SENTENCE. I 
WOULD URGE THE COURT, HOWEVER, TO STRONGLY CONSIDER IMPOSING 
THE SENTENCES CONCURRENT TO EACH OTHER BECAUSE OF THESE 
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES. I'M NOT GOING TO BELABOR THIS 
BECAUSE THE COURT SAT THROUGH THE TRIAL AND THE COURT'S HEARD 
ALL THE EVIDENCE, AND I BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE SUFFICIENT 
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES TO JUSTIFY A CONCURRENT SENTENCE. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU, MR. WEST. 
MR. WEST: THANK YOU. 
THE COURT: MR. KENDALL? 
MR. KENDALL: YOUR HONOR, THE STATE ASKS THAT YOU 
FOLLOW THE RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE PRESENTENCE REPORT FOR 
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCING. I, LIKE MR. WEST, WON'T GO INTO 
6 
EXCLUSIVE DETAIL. YOU HEARD THE TRIAL AND THE TESTIMONY. BUT 
I THINK IT IS WARRANTED, AND I WOULD ADDRESS THE AGGRAVATING 
AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES AS WELL. 
WHILE THE PRESENTENCE REPORT INVESTIGATOR ONLY NOTED 
TWO AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THERE ARE AT 
LEAST THREE OTHERS THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED OR MARKED 
AS WELL. 
NO. 5, WITH THE INJURY TO PERSON OR PROPERTY LOSS WAS 
UNUSUALLY EXTENSIVE. THIS PERSON SHOT AN INDIVIDUAL IN RUSH 
HOUR TRAFFIC. AND HE DIDN'T JUST KILL THAT PERSON, HE CAUSED 
THAT PERSON, THE CAR, TO GO OUT OF CONTROL AND HIT THREE OTHER 
VEHICLES, INJURING THOSE INDIVIDUALS, OR AT LEAST ONE OF THOSE 
INDIVIDUALS, AND CAUSING EXTENSIVE DAMAGE TO THOSE OTHER CARS. 
THE CRIME SCENE WAS SEVERAL HUNDRED FEET LONG ON A MAIN 
THOROUGHFARE ON A MAIN STREET HERE IN TOWN. 
THE FACT THAT THERE WERE MULTIPLE CHARGES OR VICTIMS. 
WE HAVE THE ONE COUNT OF MURDER AND FOUR COUNTS OF CRIMINAL 
MISCHIEF, AND WE HAVE A TOTAL OF FOUR VICTIMS THEN BECAUSE OF 
THE MULTIPLE CAR ACCIDENTS. 
ADDITIONALLY, NO. 8, THE OFFENDER'S ATTITUDE IS NOT 
CONDUCIVE TO SUPERVISION IN A LESS RESTRICTIVE SETTING. I 
THINK HE CLEARLY DEMONSTRATES THAT IN HIS DENIAL, HIS CONTINUED 
DENIAL OF RESPONSIBILITY, HIS CONTINUING TO BLAME THE VICTIM 
AND THE FACT THAT HE CONTINUES TO DENY ANY GANG AFFILIATION 
DESPITE THE STRONG EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY, BASED ON WHAT WAS 
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FOUND IN HIS APARTMENT. AND THE STATEMENTS. 
AND I THINK, I WOULD DISPUTE SEVERAL OF THE 
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WERE SUGGESTED, WITH ALL DUE 
RESPECT TO MR. WEST. HE PRESENTED HIS SELF-DEFENSE ARGUMENT TO 
THE JURY AND THE JURY LISTENED TO THAT, CONSIDERED IT AND 
REJECTED IT AND THEY FOUND THAT HE ACTED INTENTIONALLY AND 
MURDERED AN INDIVIDUAL. 
GIVEN THE SERIOUSNESS OF THAT OFFENSE, THE EFFECT 
THAT IT'S HAD ON THE LIFE OF THAT FAMILY, THE SEVERAL OTHER 
INDIVIDUALS WHO WERE INVOLVED IN THE INCIDENT, THE SERIOUS 
DISREGARD FOR ANYBODY'S SAFETY OR HUMAN LIFE THAT THIS 
INDIVIDUAL SHOWED, I'D ASK THAT THIS COURT IMPOSE THE MAXIMUM 
SENTENCE. 
THE COURT: OKAY. MR. WEST, DOES MR. GARZA WISH TO 
SPEAK? 
MR. WEST: NO. 
THE COURT: COME ON UP TO THE PODIUM THEN. 
A COUPLE OF COMMENTS, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO 
YOUR TESTIMONY AT TRIAL, MR. GARZA. I FOUND IT PARTICULARLY 
CHILLING. YOU SHOWED NO REMORSE FOR TAKING A HUMAN LIFE AND 
FOR THREATENING THE LIVES, IF IT TURNS OUT TO BE ONLY THREE 
OTHER PEOPLE, BUT THEY COULD HAVE BEEN KILLED TOO BASED ON YOUR 
CONDUCT. 
AS MR. KENDALL HAS STATED, OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO 
ME AT THE TRIAL WAS THAT NOT ONLY DID YOU SHOW NO INSIGHT INTO 
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YOUR TAKING OF ANOTHER HUMAN BEING'S LIFE, BUT YOU REPEATEDLY 
JUSTIFIED IT AND ACTED WITH A DEGREE OF PRIDE IN YOUR BEHAVIOR. 
AND THAT, AS MUCH AS ANYTHING ELSE, TELLS ME THAT YOU SIMPLY 
DON'T BELONG IN SOCIETY. 
I TRULY CAN FIND NO MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS. 
THE PROVISIONS THAT CITED, I CAN FIND UTTERLY NO EXCUSE FOR 
YOUR BEHAVIOR, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF YOUR PROTESTATIONS THAT 
YOU ARE NOT INVOLVED IN A GANG. THE ONE THING -- YOU KNOW, 
THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS, MR. GARZA. THE ONE THING THAT WOULD 
SOMEHOW PUT THIS BEHAVIOR IN A DIFFERENT CONTEXT WOULD BE IF 
YOU WERE CONSTANTLY INVOLVED IN A GANG AND IN GANG THREATS. 
YOUR DENIAL OF THAT, WHICH I WILL ACCEPT, FOR THE PURPOSES OF 
THIS SENTENCING, SHOWS THAT THERE WAS UTTERLY NO PROVOCATION 
FOR THIS. YOU KNOW, SOMEONE MAKES A GESTURE, YOU DON'T GO OUT 
AND KILL THEM, YOU DON'T SHOOT THEM AT CLOSE RANGE IN THE HEAD 
TWICE, AND THEN OTHER PARTS OF THE BODY TWICE. 
THE FACT THAT YOU'RE YOUNG, I THINK IS NOT A 
MITIGATING FACTOR. IF ANYTHING, I SEE IT AS AN AGGRAVATING 
FACTOR. I THINK YOUR YOUTH IS A DANGER. YOUR JUDGMENT IS POOR 
AS A RESULT, PERHAPS, OF YOUR YOUTH. I MEAN, THIS IS A CRIME 
OF SUCH VIOLENCE AND SUCH DANGER TO OTHER PEOPLE IT IS REALLY 
BEYOND COMPREHENSION TO ME. 
I TEND TO AGREE WITH MR. KENDALL ALSO WITH REGARD TO 
THE ADDITIONAL AGGRAVATING FACTORS OF THE PROPERTY LOSS BEING 
UNUSUALLY EXTENSIVE. YOU ENDANGERED MANY PEOPLE, HARMED BOTH 
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THE PERSONS AND PROPERTY OF PEOPLE OTHER THAN YOUR INTENDED 
VICTIM. AND THEY TOO WERE VICTIMS OF THIS OFFENSE. 
MR. GARZA, I'M SENTENCING AS FOLLOWS. ON COUNT I, 
MURDER, A 1ST DEGREE FELONY, I'M ORDERING YOU TO SERVE AN 
INDETERMINATE TERM AT THE UTAH STATE PRISON OF FIVE YEARS TO 
LIFE. 
COUNT II, CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, A 2ND DEGREE FELONY. 
I'M ORDERING THAT YOU SERVE AN INDETERMINATE TERM AT THE UTAH 
STATE PRISON OF ONE TO 15 YEARS, TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO COUNT 
I. 
COUNT III, CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, A 3RD DEGREE FELONY. 
I'M ORDERING THAT YOU SERVE AN INDETERMINATE TERM AT THE UTAH 
STATE PRISON OF ZERO TO FIVE YEARS, TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO 
COUNTS I AND II. 
COUNT IV, CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, A 3RD DEGREE FELONY. 
I'M ORDERING THAT YOU SERVE AN INDETERMINATE TERM AT THE UTAH 
STATE PRISON OF ZERO TO FIVE YEARS, TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO 
COUNTS I, II AND III. 
COUNT V, CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, A 3RD DEGREE FELONY. I'M 
ORDERING THAT YOU SERVE AN INDETERMINATE TERM AT THE UTAH STATE 
PRISON OF ZERO TO FIVE YEARS, TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO COUNTS I, 
II, III, IV. 
I'M ORDERING THAT YOU PAY FULL RESTITUTION. I'M 
RESERVING THE ISSUES REGARDING THE RESTITUTION TO MS. PALEDO 
AND PROGRESSIVE INSURANCE. I FOUND INCONSISTENCIES IN THE 
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PRESENTENCE REPORT IN THOSE. 
I'M ADOPTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESENTENCE 
REPORT WITH REGARD TO THE OTHER THREE VICTIMS. 
THIS COMMITMENT WILL COMMENCE FORTHWITH. 
I MAKE NO RECOMMENDATION ONE WAY OR ANOTHER WITH 
REGARD TO CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED. 
MR. KENDALL, WHAT ABOUT THE OTHER CASE? 
MR. KENDALL: I'M NOT SURE WHAT TO DO AT THIS POINT, 
YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OKAY. DO YOU WANT TO SET IT FOR FURTHER 
HEARING? 
MR. KENDALL: I THINK WE SHOULD. 
THE COURT: OKAY. YOU WANT TO SET IT FOR A 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE? 
MR. WEST: LET'S SET IT FOR A WITNESS PRELIMINARY 
HEARING, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: OH, JUST SET A PRELIM? 
MR. WEST: YES. 
THE COURT: OKAY. LET'S SET IT FOR A WITNESS 
PRELIMINARY HEARING. 
THE CLERK: WHAT DAY OF THE WEEK? 
MR. WEST: THURSDAY. 
MR. KENDALL: THAT'S FINE. 
THE CLERK: MAY 4TH AT 9:00 A.M. WITH JUDGE BOYDEN. 
MR. WEST: I HAVE MC CLEVE AND ATHERTON THAT MORNING. 
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DO IT WITH ONE OF THEM? 
THE CLERK: CAN WE DO IT WITH YOU? 
THE COURT: I DON'T CARE. SURE. 
THE CLERK: I CAN DO JUDGE ATHERTON. 
THE COURT: OKAY. SEE YOU THEN ON THE 4TH. 
THANK YOU MR. WEST, MR. KENDALL. 
MR. WEST: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. KENDALL: THANK YOU. 
(WHEREUPON, THE HEARING WAS CONCLUDED) . 
* * * 
ADDENDUM E 
76-3-401. Concurrent or consecutive sentences — Limitations — Definition. 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than 
one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the 
offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the order of judgment 
and commitment: 
(a) if the sentences imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; 
and 
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with 
any other sentences the defendant is already serving. 
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, 
the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of 
victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if the 
later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole, unless the 
court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be 
inappropriate. 
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the sentences 
are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall request 
clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request, the court shall enter a 
clarified order of commitment stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively 
or concurrently. 
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401. 
(6) (a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all 
sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as provided under 
Subsection (6)(b). 
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if: 
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or 
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct which 
occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed. 
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant: 
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense; 
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which were 
committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or 
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the present 
sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction, and the conduct 
giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his initial sentencing by any other 
court. 
(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of 
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board of 
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been committed for a 
single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as 
follows: 
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the maximum 
sentence is considered to be 30 years; and 
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if any, 
constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms. 
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with 
the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that provides the longer 
remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served. 
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of 
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of any 
sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually served under 
the commitments. 
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to impose 
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases. 
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed to a 
secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has not been 
terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of where the person is 
located. 
Amended by Chapter 129, 2002 General Session 
